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1 INTRODUCTION  
Twenty years before Pat Buchanan declared a culture war in 1992, conservatives in the 
1970s began advocating for a return to conservatism and traditional social and family values 
following the progress made during civil rights movements of the 1960s. Since the 1970s, the 
past forty years have seen Americans’ ideological polarization increase to their highest recorded 
levels in history. Cultural issues such as allowing LGBTQIAs to serve in the military, 
strengthening women’s rights, providing access to abortion and protection of reproductive rights, 
supporting marriage equality, favoring gun control, and acting to curb climate change have been 
wielded as cleavers for political gain, to divide traditional conservatives and progressive liberals. 
As Americans’ ideological identities become more salient social identities, these cultural issues 
begin to take on representations of what Americans believe is right and what is wrong, which has 
implications for how key historical tenets of democracy are valued and respected. Individuals’ 
perceptions that their opinions of political parties and political issues are connected to their core 
moral beliefs and fundamental sense of right and wrong are referred to as morally convicted 
attitudes. (Garrett and Bankert, 2020). Today, Buchanan’s culture war has become a battle of 
these morally convicted attitudes on the defining issues of the day and how those attitudes may 
affect how important people view democratic norms in maintaining a strong democracy. 
2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Morally convicted political attitudes heighten partisan hostility, contribute to affective 
polarization, lead to cynical views of the political opposition, and result in perceptions of 
outgroup animus (Garrett & Banker, 2020; Clifford, 2019; Ryan, 2014; Brambilla, et al., 2013); 
additionally, morally convicted attitudes lead to a willingness to accept violent means to achieve 
preferred ends (Skitka, 2010). These findings in of themselves are troubling when considering 
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the implications of heightened levels of hostility, polarization, animus, and acceptance of 
potential violence, but to date, the literature has yet to evaluate to what extent morally convicted 
attitudes affect how important Americans believe democratic norms are to maintaining a strong 
democracy in the United States. The stability of our democracy is not to be taken for granted; 
scholarship needs to continue investigating the varying external forces that may threaten that 
sustained stability. Thus, research question is: What is the effect of morally convicted attitudes 
on the importance of upholding democratic norms? This paper will review the literature and 
theories on morally convicted attitudes, moral foundations theory, and democratic norms. The 
methods section will detail the data used to assess the research question as well as the statistical 
models used to conduct the analysis. Lastly, a discussion of the results will be presented along 
with implications for future research. 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Morally Convicted Attitudes and Moral Foundations Theory 
Moral conviction is a frequent topic of research because people’s social and political 
attitudes are frequently derived from their moral concerns (e.g., Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, 
Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Emler, 2002; Haidt, 2001, 2012; Skitka, 2002) and political orientation 
appears to “reflect the moral foundations [of individuals] that are considered most relevant” 
(Day, et al., 2014, p. 1560). Moral conviction is the perception that a person’s attitude about a 
particular object is based on their moral beliefs about right and wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011) and is “experienced as strong and absolute stances on 
moralized issues” (Van Zomeren, 2011, p. 737). Throughout the literature on morally convicted 
attitudes, scholars have reached consensus that “attitudes meaningfully differ in terms of whether 
they are held with moral conviction” (Ryan, 2014, p. 382). Skitka (2010) and Turiel (1983) 
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identify three characteristics of morally convicted attitudes: 1) they are perceived as universal; 2) 
they are experienced as objective; and 3) they are independent of external authority. To evaluate 
the effect of morally convicted attitudes on the importance of democratic norms, this 
conceptualization of morally convicted attitudes should be at the forefront of measures identified 
and used in conducting analysis. 
Further, moral convictions are ripe for continued investigation because extant research 
indicates that moral convictions can predict variables such as political engagement, trust, and 
anger (Skitka, 2010; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). For instance, Skitka & Morgan (2014) found that 
morally convicted political attitudes are associated with the rejection of the rule of law and can 
motivate political violence, while Skitka (2010) concluded that varying attitudes of moral 
conviction can influence the willingness to accept violence to achieve preferred results. Ryan 
(2014) demonstrated that morally convicted attitudes can “arouse certain negative emotions, 
engender hostile opinions, and inspire punitive action” (p. 380) as well as evoke feelings of 
otherness and actions intended to drive people apart (see also Haidt, 2003; DeScioli & Kurzban, 
2009). Additionally, much of the research conducted on moral conviction demonstrates that 
opposing moral foundations can explain the increasing conflict between liberals and 
conservatives because it appears that the moral foundations of liberals and conservatives are 
based on differing foundational elements (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Hunter, 1991; Jost, 
2006; Lakoff, 2008; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). 
Building on the morality-relevant research of anthropologists (e.g., Fiske, 1991; Shweder, 
Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) and psychologists (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Schwartz, 1992; Turiel, 
1983), Haidt and colleagues have proposed that at least five foundations make up a person’s 
moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt 
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& Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Political scientists and psychologists alike have 
indicated that these five moral foundations can be a powerful predictor of ideological 
identification (Graham et al., 2009; Lakoff, 2008). For example, the individualizing foundations 
– care and fairness – are most closely associated with liberal ideology whereas the binding 
foundations – loyalty, authority, and sanctity – are most closely associated with conservative 
ideology (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). This proposition serves as the basis of moral foundations 
theory, which posits that “the morality of political liberals is built on the harm and fairness 
foundations, while the morality of political conservatives is built upon all five foundations” 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007, p. 107). In operationalizing moral conviction, it is important that the 
measures used capture these distinct foundations as driving a person’s attitude response. 
This proposed clash of political attitudes has significant implications for political 
behavior, polarization, and civility. Garrett & Bankert (2020) show that people who base their 
political opinions on moral convictions are more likely to “display more partisan bias, distance 
and hostility” (p. 621) regardless of partisan strength. Since morality is about matters of harm, 
rights, and justice (Haidt & Graham, 2007), partisan moral convictions may contribute to 
polarized political attitudes that could result in heightened partisan anger and hostility. The 
normative implication for heightened partisan anger and hostility on the strength and stability of 
democracy should not be understated. The Economist Intelligence Unit includes the functioning 
of government, political participation, and political culture in its democracy index (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020); thus, understanding how morally convicted attitudes may 
affect the importance of democratic norms is value added to the body of existing research. 
H1: Morally convicted attitudes affect how important democratic norms are seen 
to be in maintaining a strong democracy. 
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3.2 Democratic Norms 
Democratic norms are unwritten rules and expected standards of behavior that stabilize 
and legitimize democracy (Azari & Smith, 2012). Goldstone and Ulfelder (2004) conclude that 
stable democracies promote fair and open competition, avoid political polarization, and impose 
constraints on executive authority. Dahl (2021) includes effective participation, inclusion, 
fundamental rights, and independent sources of information in his conceptualization of the 
features of an ideal democracy. In measuring democratic norms on the ANES, items ask for how 
important respondents believe specific norms are maintaining a strong democracy in the United 
States. These items include whether news organizations should be free to criticize political 
leaders; whether the three branches of government should keep one another from gaining too 
much political power; whether elected officials should face serious consequences for engaging in 
misconduct; and, whether people should agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically.  
4 DATA AND METHODS 
What is the effect of morally convicted attitudes on the importance of democratic norms 
in maintaining a strong democracy? This thesis uses the American National Election Studies 
2020 Time Series Study data to analyze the extent to which morally convicted attitudes affect 
held beliefs on the importance of democratic norms in maintaining a strong democracy. The 
2020 Time Series Study is a nationally representative sample of adults in the United States. From 
this data, I identified questions that reflect the explanatory variables, response variable, and 
control variables. For the explanatory variable of morally convicted attitudes (perceptions 
connected to one’s core moral beliefs and fundamental sense of right and wrong), I have created 
two different scales: egalitarianism, a measurement comprised of questions related to equality 
and opportunity, and moral traditionalism, a measurement comprised of questions on moral 
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behavior and traditional family values. These two scales are necessary to complete this analysis 
because the ANES does not include a measure of morally convicted attitudes. Since morally 
convicted attitudes are the perception that a person’s attitude about a particular object is based on 
their moral beliefs about right and wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Wisneski, 
2011), I have determined that the ANES’ questions on egalitarianism and moral traditionalism 
can effectively represent those attitude perceptions on right and wrong. Egalitarianism is 
captured by the following items: that society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity, 
that the country would be better off if we worried less about equality, that it is not a big deal if 
some people have more chance in life, and that if people were treated more fairly, there would be 
fewer problems. Each item is assessed on a range from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly) 
and each item is coded so that they run in the same direction. This constructed egalitarianism 
scale has demonstrated longevity in the field, following the seminal work of Feldman (1988) that 
used several items from the ANES to create an additive scale for equality of opportunity, similar 
to this egalitarianism scale. For the egalitarianism scale, an index score of 20 indicates strong 
disagreement with statements of egalitarianism whereas an index score of 4 indicates strong 
agreement with such statements. In other words, the higher the index score, the more strongly the 
respondent agrees with statements of egalitarianism. The mean egalitarian score is 11.2. 
For moral traditionalism, the items included are as follows: the world is always changing, 
and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; and that this country would 
have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. Each item is 
assessed on a range from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly) and each item is coded so 
that they run in the same direction. An index score of 10 indicates strong disagreement with 
statements of moral traditionalism, whereas an index score of 2 indicates strong agreement with 
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such statements; thus, a lower index score indicates more agreement with moral traditionalism. 
The mean moral traditionalism score is 5.4. These items for both the egalitarianism scale and the 
moral traditionalism scale moderately represent morally convicted attitudes because they 
tangentially respondents’ perceived attitudes of right and wrong by incorporating questions on 
equality, equal opportunity, morality, and traditional values. 
The response variable, the importance of democratic norms in maintaining a strong 
democracy, is comprised of the following items: that news organizations should be free to 
criticize political leaders; that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government 
should keep one another from having too much power; that elected officials should face serious 
consequences if they engage in misconduct; and, that people should agree on basic facts even if 
they disagree politically. Each item is assessed on a range from 1 (not important at all) to 5 
(extremely important) and each item is coded so that they run in the same direction. The 
democratic norms scale ranges from 0 to 20, with 0 indicating that democratic norms are not 
important at all to maintaining a strong democracy and 20 indicating that democratic norms are 
extremely important to maintaining a strong democracy. The mean index score for democratic 
norms is 17.0, which is quite high! Normatively, this bodes well for collective maintenance of a 
strong democracy, if the national sample from the ANES considers these selected democratic 
norms as very important. 
Finally, one of the control variables is authoritarianism, from least authoritarian to most 
authoritarian. This scale is determined by a series of questions that ask the respondent what 
qualities are more important for children to possess, some of which are more associated with 
authoritarianism than others. The qualities from which the respondent determines which is more 
important are: independence or respect for others; curiosity or good manners; obedience or self-
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reliance; and, being considerate or well-behaved. The authoritarianism scale ranges from 2 (least 
authoritarian) to 8 (most authoritarian) with a mean score of 6.0.  An additional control variable 
is ideological identification, as determined by the respondent’s self-placement along a seven-
point ideological scale, from Extremely Liberal to Extremely Conservative; the mean ideological 
identification as 4.1, indicating “moderate; middle of the road.” 
To ascertain internal validity of these scales, I calculated Cronbach’s Alpha for each additive 
index, with results included in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Index Raw Alpha Reliability 
Moral Egalitarianism 0.75 Acceptable 
Democratic Norms 0.72 Acceptable 
Moral Traditionalism 0.50 Poor 
Authoritarianism 0.66 Questionable 
 
In conducting exploratory analysis of the variables, I created a histogram of the 
distribution of the democratic norms scale (Figure 1), which shows that the survey sample of this 
scale has a mean of 17.03, standard deviation of 2.73, and moderately right-skewed distribution 
at -0.95. Normatively, this distribution and its 17.03 mean are encouraging as they demonstrate 
most respondents consider democratic norms that can maintain a strong democracy between 
moderately important and very important. With right skewedness, I also calculated the 10% 
trimmed mean, resulting in a trimmed mean of 17.3, further supporting the normative 
implications of having a sample that considers democratic norms important in maintaining a 
strong democracy. 




 However, the boxplot of this distribution (Graph 2) provides more context to the 
right-skewedness showing the range of outliers in the sample, all of which are in the bottom 25th 
percentile. While the sample does not include many responses noting democratic norms to be not 
at all important or very little important, these outliers nonetheless communicate a narrative that 
democratic norms as important to maintaining a strong democracy is not a foregone conclusion. 
 
Figure 2 
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Further exploratory data analysis shows a linear relationship between ideology and 
importance of democratic norms with importance on maintaining a strong democracy declining 
as self-placement trends towards Extremely Conservative. A linear relationship also exists 
between importance of democratic norms and egalitarianism, with the importance of democratic 
norms increasing as egalitarianism increases. Lastly, moral traditionalism and the importance of 
democratic norms also share a linear relationship, with the importance of democratic norms 
decreasing as moral traditionalism becomes stronger. 
To test my hypothesis that morally convicted attitudes affect the importance of 
democratic norms, I initially conducted two linear regression models, the effect of egalitarianism 
and moral traditionalism, respectively, on importance of democratic norms while controlling for 
ideology, authoritarianism, political interest, economic perspective, sex, age, and education. I 
determined two separate regressions were necessary because I selected egalitarianism and moral 
traditionalism to represent morally convicted attitudes, but since they are so highly correlated, 
these independent variables needed to be regressed separately to ensure the minimization of any 
endogenous influence on the dependent variable. 
Further, I also disaggregated the scale of democratic norms to analyze the effect of 
egalitarianism and moral traditionalism on each of the democratic norms items. This 
disaggregation allows for each regression model to evaluate the linear relationship between the 
independent variables and each item of the dependent variable on their own. In doing so, the 
analysis can demonstrate if there is greater association between certain items rather than others, 
and how that might also affect the interpretation of the results. 
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5 RESULTS 
The first regression analysis (Table 2) shows the effect of egalitarianism on the 
importance of democratic norms. A 1-point increase in egalitarianism is associated with a 0.07 
increase in the importance of democratic norms. Stronger agreement with egalitarianism is 
associated with an increase in placing more importance on maintaining a strong democracy and 
this result is statistically significant. While statistically significant, a 0.07 increase in the 
importance of democratic norms is such a small margin in practical application. Further, this 
model also shows that a 1-point increase in ideology is associated with a 0.34 decrease in 
importance of democratic norms and a 1-point increase in authoritarianism is also associated 
with a 0.49 decrease in importance of democratic norms, both which are statistically significant 
as well. In this model showing the effect of egalitarianism, the results for ideology and 
authoritarianism indicate that as ideology increases (thus, moves towards Extremely 
Conservative) and as strength of authoritarianism increases, then the importance of democratic 
norms in maintaining a strong democracy declines. Given the literature on egalitarianism, 
liberalism, and authoritarianism, this finding is expected and still provides important context for 
the normative implications of this regression model. For those who trend towards egalitarianism, 
the results show a propensity to consider democratic norms as important for maintaining a strong 
democracy. 
Table 2 The Effect of Egalitarianism on the Importance of Democratic Norms 
 dem norms 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 20.78 20.07, 21.49 <0.001 
Egalitarian scale 0.07 0.04, 0.10 <0.001 
Ideology -0.34 -0.38, -0.30 <0.001 
Authoritarian scale -0.49 -0.56, -0.41 <0.001 
Education 0.26 0.22, 0.29 <0.001 
Sex -0.56 -0.68, -0.44 <0.001 
Political interest -0.67 -0.76, -0.57 <0.001 
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Economic perception 0.04 -0.03, 0.11 0.240 
Age 0.01 0.00, 0.01 <0.001 
Observations 6057 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.208 / 0.207 
 
The second regression (Table 3) shows the effect of moral traditionalism on the 
importance of democratic norms. In this model, a 1-point increase in moral traditionalism 
(moving towards strongly disagreeing with moral traditionalism) is associated with a 0.06 
increase in the importance of democratic norms, and this finding is statistically significant. In 
other words, more disagreement with moral traditionalism is associated with placing more 
importance on democratic norms. This result indicates that moving from strongly agree with 
moral traditionalism (2) to strongly disagree with moral traditionalism (10) results in a decrease 
of less than one point on the scale of democratic norms importance. The controlling effects of 
ideology and authoritarianism are nearly identical to that of the results of the egalitarian model 
(Table 2). From a normative standpoint, these regression results are important as they indicate a 
positive correlation between disagreeing with moral traditionalism and placing importance on 
democratic norms for maintaining a strong democracy. Given the literature on moral 
traditionalism, this association makes sense because disagreeing with moral traditionalism 
predicts less emphasis on individual freedom and traditional values and more acceptance for 
democratic norms. 
Table 3 The Effect of Moral Traditionalism on Strong Democracy 
  dem norms 
Predictors Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 21.23 20.57, 21.90 <0.001 
Moral traditionalism scale 0.06 0.01, 0.10 0.008 
Ideology -0.35 -0.39, -0.31 <0.001 
Authoritarian scale -0.48 -0.56, -0.41 <0.001 
Education 0.26 0.23, 0.29 <0.001 
Sex -0.55 -0.68, -0.43 <0.001 
Political interest -0.66 -0.76, -0.57 <0.001 
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Economic perception 0.05 -0.02, 0.11 0.175 
Age 0.01 0.00, 0.01 <0.001 
Observations 6057 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.206 / 0.205 
 
The research question asks what effect morally convicted attitudes has on the importance 
of upholding democratic norms to maintain a strong democracy and the results indicate that both 
egalitarianism (people are equal and deserve equal rights and opportunities) and moral 
traditionalism (respecting and upholding traditional values and morals) – taken together to 
operationalize morally convicted attitudes – influence the importance of democratic norms. 
5.1 Regression Models Disaggregating the Democratic Norms Scale 
When disaggregating the importance of democratic norms scale (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7), each 
individual item regressed with moral traditionalism is still statistically significant except the 
measure assessing whether people should agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically. 
Each individual democratic norm is a measurement of how important the respondent feels the 
norm is to maintain a strong democracy, from “not important at all” (1) to “extremely important” 
(5). When moral traditionalism is 0 (strongly agree with moral traditionalism, the press norm 
averages 4.73 (“very important”). When moral traditionalism increases by one point, then there 
is an associated 0.02 increase in the press norm. The effects of moral traditionalism on the 
democratic norms including freedom of the press, separation of the branches, and consequences 
for misconduct are all statistically significant; however, the magnitude of each effect is quite 
small. When looking at the norm that the press be free to criticize political leaders, a one-point 
increase is moral traditionalism (more disagreement with moral traditionalism) results in a 0.25-
point decrease in ideological identification (toward extremely liberal). In other words, when 
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evaluating the linear relationship between moral traditionalism and the freedom of the press 
norm, there is an associated effect on ideology, moving towards a liberal identification. 
Table 4 
  norm news norm branches 
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p 




0.02 0.00, 0.04 0.015 0.03 0.02, 0.05 <0.001 
Ideology -0.25 -0.27, -0.24 <0.001 -0.05 -0.06, -0.03 <0.001 
Education 0.11 0.10, 0.13 <0.001 0.08 0.07, 0.09 <0.001 
Sex -0.32 -0.38, -0.26 <0.001 -0.11 -0.15, -0.07 <0.001 
Political interest -0.23 -0.28, -0.19 <0.001 -0.15 -0.18, -0.12 <0.001 
Economic 
perception 
0.06 0.03, 0.09 <0.001 -0.00 -0.02, 0.02 0.827 
Age 0.00 0.00, 0.00 <0.001 0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.001 
Observations 6057 6057 
R2 / R2adjusted 0.198 / 0.197 0.095 / 0.094 
 
Table 5 
  norm officials norm facts 
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p 




0.02 0.01, 0.03 0.001 0.01 -0.01, 0.02 0.210 
Ideology -0.03 -0.04, -0.02 <0.001 -0.07 -0.09, -0.06 <0.001 
Education 0.04 0.04, 0.05 <0.001 0.05 0.04, 0.06 <0.001 
Sex -0.01 -0.04, 0.03 0.688 -0.11 -0.16, -0.07 <0.001 
Political interest -0.14 -0.17, -0.12 <0.001 -0.16 -0.19, -0.13 <0.001 
Economic 
perception 
0.01 -0.01, 0.02 0.526 -0.02 -0.04, 0.00 0.099 
Age 0.00 0.00, 0.00 <0.001 -0.00 -0.00, 0.00 0.986 
Observations 6057 6057 
R2 / R2adjusted 0.063 / 0.062 0.059 / 0.058 
 
These results are repeated when each individual item is regressed with egalitarianism 
(Tables 6 and 7), including agreement on basic facts not being statistically significant. Following 
the disaggregation of the items that comprise the democratic norms scale, these results indicate 
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that the estimates and effects between moral traditionalism (Tables 4a and 4b) and egalitarianism 
(Tables 5a and 5b) are nearly identical. Thus, the findings of the earlier regression models 
(Tables 2 and 3) represent the holistic effect of the democratic norms scale as opposed to the 
possibility that one or two individual norms may be overly influential in the scale. 
Table 6 
  norm news norm branches 
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 4.38 4.11, 4.65 <0.001 4.34 4.16, 4.52 <0.001 
Egalitarian scale 0.04 0.03, 0.06 <0.001 0.02 0.01, 0.03 <0.001 
Ideology -0.25 -0.27, -0.23 <0.001 -0.05 -0.06, -0.03 <0.001 
Education 0.11 0.10, 0.13 <0.001 0.08 0.07, 0.09 <0.001 
Sex -0.33 -0.39, -0.27 <0.001 -0.11 -0.15, -0.07 <0.001 
Political interest -0.23 -0.28, -0.19 <0.001 -0.16 -0.18, -0.13 <0.001 
Economic 
perception 
0.05 0.02, 0.09 0.001 -0.00 -0.03, 0.02 0.643 
Age 0.00 0.00, 0.00 <0.001 0.00 0.00, 0.00 <0.001 
Observations 6057 6057 
R2 / R2adjusted 0.201 / 0.201 0.094 / 0.093 
 
Table 7 
  norm officials norm facts 
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p 
(Intercept) 4.52 4.37, 4.67 <0.001 4.66 4.45, 4.86 <0.001 
Egalitarian scale 0.01 0.01, 0.02 0.001 0.00 -0.01, 0.01 1.000 
Ideology -0.03 -0.04, -0.02 <0.001 -0.08 -0.09, -0.06 <0.001 
Education 0.05 0.04, 0.05 <0.001 0.05 0.04, 0.06 <0.001 
Sex -0.01 -0.04, 0.03 0.690 -0.11 -0.16, -0.07 <0.001 
Political interest -0.14 -0.17, -0.12 <0.001 -0.16 -0.19, -0.13 <0.001 
Economic 
perception 
0.00 -0.01, 0.02 0.652 -0.02 -0.04, 0.00 0.092 
Age 0.00 0.00, 0.00 <0.001 -0.00 -0.00, 0.00 0.989 
Observations 6057 6057 
R2 / R2adjusted 0.063 / 0.062 0.059 / 0.058 
 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The results indicate that morally convicted political attitudes, operationalized as a 
measure of egalitarianism and moral traditionalism, do affect how important respondents 
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consider democratic norms to be in maintaining a strong democracy. Stronger agreement with 
egalitarianism and more disagreement with moral traditionalism are both associated with an 
increase in placing more importance on democratic norms. In other words, more agreement with 
beliefs in equality and equal opportunity and more disagreement with commitment to traditional 
values are associated with considering democratic norms as important in maintaining a strong 
democracy. While the results have valuable normative implications – for example, the positive 
association between agreement with positions of equality and importance of democratic norms 
indicates that a more egalitarian viewpoint lends itself perhaps to more support for democratic 
norms – there are significant weaknesses in the methodology of this research. 
Conceptualizing morally convicted attitudes as being represented by both egalitarianism 
and moral traditionalism may not accurately measure how the literature defines moral 
conviction. Unfortunately, in electing to use the ANES data, there appears to be a mismatch 
between the moral foundations theory upon which my hypothesis is based, and the actual data 
used to test said hypothesis. Thus, this leaves much room for future research to better identify a 
measurement that more accurately measures moral conviction. For example, measuring 
respondents’ perception that their feelings are being invoked based on their moral beliefs about 
right and wrong could perhaps be better accomplished through a survey- or questionnaire- based 
experiment. By providing participants with specific objects to which moral conviction may be 
elicited, survey responses may more acutely measure these perceptions. Additionally, the poor 
internal validity of the moral traditionalism additive index provides another reason to find a more 
robust measure of moral conviction. 
Understanding the effect of morally convicted attitudes is an important area for further 
research given the politicization of culture and social issues. The country has seen increasing 
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levels of affective polarization and greater frequencies of political hostility and incivility. While 
this analysis does not contribute robust findings to the discourse, the study can be expanded upon 
through more sophisticated quantitative measures and survey experiments to more thoroughly 
investigate the question at hand.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
ANES 2020 Selected Questions 
Ideological Identification 
V201200: 7pt scale liberal‐conservative self‐placement: Where would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven’t you thought much about this? 
Democratic Norms 
V201366: How important that news organizations free to criticize political leaders 
V201367: How important branches of government keep one another from too much power 
V201368: How important elected officials face serious consequences if they engage 
in misconduct 
V201369: How important that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically 
Egalitarianism 
V202260: Society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity 
V202261: We’d be better off if worried less about equality 
V202262: It’s not a big problem if some have more chance in life 
V202263: If people were treated more fairly would be fewer probs 
Moral Traditionalism 
V202264: The world is changing and we should adjust view of moral behavior 
V202265: Fewer problems if there was more emphasis on traditional family values 
